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THE BUMPY ROAD OF HOME STATES’ REGULATION OF GLOBALISED BUSINESSES – 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DISRUPTIONS TO SUPPLY CHAIN DISCLOSURE UNDER THE 
MODERN SLAVERY ACT 
 
 
In response to the paradigm shift from territorial corporations to global businesses and supply chains, States are 
increasingly engaging in regulating extraterritorial business activities, supply chain disclosure regulation being a 
primary example. Much ink has thus far spilled on the intrinsic doctrinal and conceptual aspects of  this 
regulatory approach, with its interactions to the external regulatory and institutional environment explored far less 
to date. This article seeks to correct the scholarly imbalance by critically examining how s.54 of  the UK Modern 
Slavery Act (MSA) – a prominent attempt among state-level initiatives designed to promote human rights 
protection within global supply chains – fits with other extraterritorial initiatives and the broad supply chain 
environment in which it operates. An exploration of  the likely disruptive effects on the enforcement of  supply chain 
disclosure regulation follows thereafter. The paper intends to bring to light the doctrinal, contextual and practical 
complexities faced by current home-state lawmaking endeavours, in the hope of  generating further insights into the 
intricate but significant issue of  imposing human rights responsibilities on globalised businesses. 
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“Home from home” – in point of  regulation, this idiomatic expression is becoming an increasing 
reality for focal companies and their subordinates in multinational groups. 1 Facing novel 
sustainability challenges posed by labour and environmental exploitation in the globalised 
business context, and with the power of  MNEs greatly outpacing the growth of  the international 
regulatory frameworks that control them,2 it is no longer unusual for a home state to fill 
governance gaps and hold a focal company responsible for activities in its supply chains beyond 
its national borders.3  
 
To take business and human rights as an example, in line with the current international regulatory 
framework and an overall expectation on home states as key performers/duty-bearers in human 
rights protection, two approaches currently form the polar extremes of  a home state’s regulatory 
taxonomy, reflecting the ostensibly irreconcilable impasse between human rights advocacy groups 
and businesses.4 At one end of  the spectrum is a hard law regime imposing substantive duties on 
corporations, with the 2003 UN Norms being a typical instance of  this.5 Towards the other end 
lies the much softer UN Protect, Respect and Remedy framework, which defined the nature of  
businesses’ responsibility to respect human rights as a social norm over and above “compliance to 
laws and regulations”,6 different from the 2003 “hard” duty recommendation.7 Despite the fact 
that the 2003 UN Norms experienced a gloomy fate in practice,8 this espousal of  progressively 
hard laws to ensure that businesses uphold human rights has received a good deal of  sympathy in 
a number of  jurisdictions. For instance, English law recently held holding companies to owe at 
least some duty to sustainability victims harmed by their overseas subsidiaries, with the possibility 
of  extending this wide accountability to related institutions in global supply chains. Meanwhile, 
one may also see an assortment of  international/national governance initiatives embodying the 
                                                             
1 In this article, the term “holding company” is used to denote a company created to buy and own the shares of other 
companies, which it then controls in a group context. The term is often used interchangeably with the concept of 
“parent company”. The term “focal company” refers to a business entity that governs the supply chain and has 
bargaining power over its business partners. The latter may well include holding companies. 
2 International law only recognises individuals and states as possible perpetrators of certain human rights abuses, and 
does not accept private business defendants. Uta Kohl, Corporate Human Rights Accountability: The Objections of 
Western Governments to the Alien Tort Statute, (2014) 63(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 665, 670. 
3 “Governance gaps” associated with the expansion of globalised businesses are defined as “(the gap) between the scope and 
impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences”. John Gerard Ruggie, Protect, 
Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008). 
Glen Whelan, Jeremy Moon & Marc Orlitzky, “Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Embedded Liberalism: 
What Chance Consensus?” (2009) 87 Journal of Business Ethics 367-383. 
4 John Gerard Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (WW Norton & Company, New York, 
2013), xvi, 68 & 76. 
5 The UN Norms stipulate that transnational firms and other business enterprises have corresponding legal duties 
within their spheres of activity and influence, compliance be monitored by a rigid enforcement mechanism, and victims 
be provided with effective remedies. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003). at paras 1 & 15-18. 
6 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework, (United Nations, New York, 2011), Principle 11 
Commentary. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The Norms encountered fierce opposition from various States and the business community. The UN Commission 
on Human Rights eventually declared that although the document contained some useful elements and ideas, it was 
only a draft proposal and had no legal standing. John Gerard Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The Evolving 
International Agenda” (2007) 101 American Journal of International Law 819, 821. 
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essence of  the soft Protect, Respect and Remedy framework, a prominent example being the 
latest version of  s.54 of  the UK Modern Slavery Act (MSA), a supply chain disclosure 
requirement that “merely provide(s) statutory endorsement to existing voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) reporting initiatives”.9 Practice has thus far brought to life a wide usage of  both regulatory 
approaches, intensifying a need of  examining their doctrinal and pragmatic compatibilities. This 
is the analysis to which this paper turns. 
 
This paper aims to utilise the corporate disclosure requirement enshrined in s.54 of  the UK 
MSA10 as an example of  latest home states’ soft corporate responsibility lawmaking efforts to 
foster business self-regulation, and explore its interactions with other progressively hard law 
means with extraterritorial impacts. While s. 54 of  the MSA has thus far been under intensive 
scholarly spotlight, the existing literature has concentrated on the intrinsic doctrinal and 
conceptual features of  this latest regulatory approach,11 with its fits to the external regulatory 
and institutional environment explored far less to date. Building upon and complementing 
existing research on social disclosure regulation, the paper intends to fill the current literature 
void by investigating the regulatory interactions between s.54 and recent common law 
developments on companies’ duty of  care and extraterritorial jurisdiction,12 the institutional 
compatibility of  s.54 to the broad supply chain environment that it operates in, as well as the 
resulting impacts on the enforcement of  s.54.  
 
This consideration of  the legal and institutional disruptions in the application of  s.54 of  MSA is 
also one aspect of  a much broader reappraisal of  the regulatory paradigm of  booming global 
outsourcing and transnational business activities. Although globalisation has, in the eyes of  some, 
made the Westphalian sovereignty belief  somewhat archaic,13 it would not be right to simply 
assume that globalisation erodes the frontiers of  national sovereignty. As presented by the 
UNCTAD, diverse societies are still reasonably expected to have diverse interests and different 
capacities to discharge international law obligations.14 In the absence of  a widely adopted 
international legal framework, national and regional regulation plays a particularly important role 
in responding to “the peaks and troughs in the international regulatory landscape”,15 with the field of  
business and human rights being a typical instance. Up to the present, states remain the primary 
duty bearers of  human rights. Both horizontal (actions between private actors) and vertical (states’ 
violations of  private actors’ rights) applications of  international human rights law still depend 
                                                             
9 Genevieve LeBaron & Andreas Rühmkorf, “The Domestic Politics of Corporate Accountability Legislation: 
Struggles over the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act” (2017) Socio-Economic Review 1, at 3. 
10 S.54 of the UK MSA. 
11 E.g., Shuangge Wen, “The Cogs and Wheels of Reflexive Law: Business Disclosure under the Modern Slavery Act” 
(2016) 43(3) Journal of Law and Society 327; Iris H-Y Chiu, Unpacking the Reforms in Europe and UK Relating to 
Mandatory Disclosure in Corporate Social Responsibility: Instituting a Hybrid Governance Model to Change 
Corporate Behaviour? (2017) 14(5) European Company Law 193; Rae Lindsay, Anna Kirkpatrick & Jo En Low, Hardly 
Soft Law: The Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Trend towards Mandatory Corporate Reporting on Human Rights 
(2017) 18(1) Business Law International 29. 
12 See infra notes 51-101 and relevant texts. 
13 A. Claire Cutler, “Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organisation: A 
Crisis of Legitimacy” (2001) 27 Review of International Studies 133-150. 
14 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The Social Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations (United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1999), at iii. 
15 Ryan J. Turner, “Transnational Supply Chain Regulation: Extraterritorial Regulation as Corporate Law’s New 
Frontier” (2016) 17 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, at 16. 
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heavily on the contextualisation of  domestic laws and regulations.16 Discussions of  s.54 of  the 
MSA and its interactions with other extraterritorial regulatory initiatives and institutional factors, 
additional to its significance in securing fundamental human rights in transnational business 
practice, thus also touch on the wider ramifications of  supply chain management in the 
contemporary world, and even on the broad sustainability agenda underpinning all societies and 
economies.17 
 
In the meantime, delineating the detailed regulatory fabric of  corporate responsibilities in relation 
to human rights within such a broad ambit, loosely defined as a corporation’s sphere of  
influence,18 is, to say the least, a difficult job for a home state. Despite their mutual ambition of  
eradicating human rights abuses in MNE operations, even a cursory look at the above-mentioned 
soft and hard regulatory initiatives reveals huge variations in their jurisprudence and institutional 
designs, reflecting a variety of  distinct ideological and national-contextual underpinnings; it also 
shows deep divisions surrounding the interests and preferences of  stakeholders impacting and 
affected by relevant rule-making.19 A large number of  NGOs, sceptical of  the merits of  
laissez-faire capitalism, expressed limited confidence in the effectiveness of  soft CSR initiatives in 
improving corporate performance.20 Considerable doubt has since been thrown upon soft 
human rights initiatives, including those developed by MNEs (multinational enterprises), with the 
most critical voices even describing these business giants as modern day “leviathans”.21 
 
Despite substantial suspicion from NGOs, soft corporate responsibilities to “respect” human 
rights manage to obtain considerable support from influential members of  the business 
community, including the International Chamber of  Commerce, the International Organisation 
of  Employers, and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD.22 At the time 
                                                             
16 David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, “The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International 
Law” (2003-04) 44(4) Virginia Journal of International Law 931, at 935; United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related 
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 15 Feb, 2005, at 12. 
17 E.g. P. Beske & S. Seuring, “Putting Sustainability into Supply Chain Management” (2014) 19(3) Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal 322-331; Galit A Sarfaty, “Shining Light on Global Supply Chains” (2015) 56 (2) 
Harvard International Law Journal 419; Steve John New, Modern Slavery and the Supply Chain: the Limits of Corporate 
Social Responsibility, (2015) 20(6) Supply Chain Management: An International Journal 697. 
18 The UN Global Compact asked the corporate participants to “embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of influence” 
principles relevant to human rights protection and promotion. The sphere of influence may be interpreted as a set of 
concentric circles mapping out stakeholders in a company’s value chain, with company workplace at the core, moving 
outwards to supply chains, the market place, the community and the government. John Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts of 
“Sphere of Influence” and “Complicity”, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, A/HRC/8/16 (Human Rights Council, 15 May 2008), , at para 8. 
19 For instance, LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 9, compared the lawmaking process of the UK MSA with the 
Bribery Act, and concluded that the weak force of s. 54 of the MSA was largely due to industry actors’ less direct but 
successful opposition to public regulation, which was done by way of supporting statutory endorsement to existing 
voluntary CSR initiatives and reporting. 
20 For instance, Amnesty International expressly gave support to extraterritorial hard law measures, believing they “can 
be developed to address (the) lacuna (of business and human rights).” Amnesty International, Submission to the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, July 2008, 
available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/40000/ior800032010eng.pdf. Much scholarly ink has 
also been spilled in the legal community, voicing similar concerns and suggesting the development of legally binding 
instruments regarding human rights violations. E.g., Aurora Voiculescu, “Human Rights and the New Corporate 
Accountability: Learning from Recent Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability” (2009) 87(S2) Journal of Business 
Ethics 419-432; Justine Nolan & Luke Taylor, “Corporate Responsibility for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Rights in Search of a Remedy?” (2009) 87(S2) Journal of Business Ethics 433-451. 
21 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Bruce Mazlish, “Introduction” in Chandler & Mazlish (eds) Leviathans: Multinational 
Corporations and the New Global History (CUP, 2005), at 1-18. 
22 Whelan et al., supra note 3, at 377. 
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of  writing, the business community, scholars and NGOs have been far from speaking with one 
voice regarding the most suitable regulatory method to tackle business and human rights at the 
home state level. This division has led to a simultaneous adoption of  various regulatory means 
with extraterritorial reach. Resulting disparities in the levels of  stringency of  these different 
regulatory instruments further lead to reciprocal disturbance in their concurrent application, 
providing compelling reasons for thinking again about the issue of  regulatory interaction and 
compatibilities. 
 
This paper is therefore also set against the backdrop of  an ongoing movement towards regulating 
MNEs by virtue of  home state regulation, to see how transnational norms with the aim of  
promoting corporate accountability are being shaped and interacting with domestic legislative 
frameworks. The argument will suggest that although recent UK extraterritorial regulation 
developments constitute a significant step forward in improving sustainability and human rights 
protection in global supply chains, in terms of  both extending “hard law” protection to victims 
and strengthening corporate social responsibility efforts, they lack coherence in both logic and 
institutional design. Contradictions in their doctrinal underpinnings and disparities in their levels 
of  stringency lead to reciprocal disruptions in application. 
 
To further clarify, it is not our aim to refute these regulatory endeavours to tackle business and 
human rights challenges, with whose fundamental premises and ideals we fully agree. Rather, we 
intend to bring to light the doctrinal, contextual and practical difficulties faced by current 
home-state lawmaking endeavours, particularly in the form of  supply chain disclosure regulation, 
in the hope of  generating further insights into the complex but important issue of  imposing 
human rights responsibilities on MNEs. We thus hope to build a bridge between law and other 
disciplines involved in the study of  supply chain management, from which a valuable mutual 
discourse could ensue. This will not only be of  interest to policymakers, industry actors and 
anti-slavery activists who “have heralded this wave of  legislation as a game-changer”,23 but also responds 
to mounting awareness and concerns among consumers, investors and other stakeholders.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Part I identifies the major approaches adopted by home states 
in responding to the regulatory challenges created by global outsourcing and MNEs’ activities. 
The UK is utilised as a primary example, with s.54 of  the MSA embodying CSR ideals and recent 
case law imposing a hard law duty of  care upon holding corporations occupying the polar 
extremes of  its extraterritorial regulatory taxonomy on business and human rights. Part II 
discusses in detail the interactions between these regulatory means in the course of  their 
implementation, as well as their likely disruptive effects on the enforcement of  s.54. Part III 
further highlights institutional impediments to the effective implementation of  s.54, implicating 
its restricted practical effects in increasing corporate transparency and eliminating modern slavery 
offences in global chains. The discussions in Parts II and III are supported by data-based 
evidence presented in Part IV. Part V puts forward some suggestions for future regulatory reform, 
and the last section concludes the paper. 
                                                             
23 LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 9, at 2. 
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I. REGULATORY CHALLENGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY GLOBAL 
OUTSOURCING 
A. Global Outsourcing and Resulting Discrepancies between the Corporate and Legal 
Worlds 
Global outsourcing – the practice of  sub-contracting business to third parties in other countries24 
– has become a contemporary source of  institutional innovation and operational transformation, 
rather than a mere means of  price arbitrage.25 Typical players involve integrated MNEs in the 
form of  group companies and transnational contractual network enterprises. While their global 
outsourcing activities significantly promote economic development and are seen as a trigger for 
the next industrial revolution,26 their power and control arrangements that defy territorial 
boundaries also pose novel challenges to existing frameworks of  company law, which are 
predominantly State-based.  
 
Under conventional company law, the above-mentioned two ways by which MNEs manipulate 
capital boundaries reduce or eliminate the potential legal liabilities of  the holding company or the 
focal company, which is legally isolated from other production units within the corporate 
group/network, owing to the domestic nature of  corporate laws and the separate legal 
personality orthodoxy.27 The difficulty of  distributing legal responsibility on a corporate group 
basis, and the jurisdictional concern of  the holding (or focal) company often being situated in a 
different jurisdiction from that in which the harm occurs, lead to accountability failures by these 
entities. The burgeoning of  outsourcing activities under the separate legal personality principle – 
the fundamental cornerstone of  corporate law in almost every jurisdiction – while perhaps not 
intending to, thus practically serves the purpose of  expanding MNE immunity from legal liability, 
concealing “the reality of  economic integration of  interdependence”.28 At the very least, integral corporate 
operations through external contractual relations with other companies, or through subsidiaries 
in modern supply chains, lead to transaction cost reductions as well as unjustifiable limits upon 
business entities’ legal responsibility. Just as remarked by Templeman LJ, 
 
“English company law possesses some curious features, which may generate curious results. A parent company may 
spawn a number of  subsidiary companies, all controlled directly or indirectly by the shareholders of  the parent 
company. If  one of  the subsidiary companies, to change the metaphor, turns out to be the runt of  the litter and 
declines into insolvency to the dismay of  its creditors, the parent company and the other subsidiary companies may 
prosper to the joy of  the shareholders without any liability for the debts of  the insolvent subsidiary.”29 
 
                                                             
24 Sarfaty, supra note 17, at 425.  
25 Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2016 Global Outsourcing Survey: Outsourcing Accelerates Forward, June 2016, 3. 
26 Alan S. Blinders, “Offshoring: The Next Industrial Revolution?” Foreign Affairs (Mar./Apr. 2006), available at 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-03-01/offshoring-next-industrial-revolution.. 
27 Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433. Also Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, showing the reluctance 
of English courts to acknowledge “piercing the corporate veil” as a general doctrine of law. 
28 Hugh Collins, “Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex Patterns of Economic Integration” (1990) 
53(6) Modern Law Review 731, at 742. 
29 Re Southard & Co Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 1198, 1208, per Templeman LJ. 
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B. Economic Integration Complications in Supply Chains 
 
Viewed from an economic perspective, the variety of  business integration forms further adds to 
the difficulty of  imposing legal liability on transnational corporate players. Conventional English 
law used to recognise ownership and resulting control as major forms of  bonding between 
economically integrated organisations, on the basis of  which they may be regarded as one group 
rather than separate individual entities for responsibility purposes.30 In the context of  global 
supply chains, patterns of  group company integration often exceed connections based upon 
ownership and follow-on control. A typical pattern of  integration is dynamically hierarchical, 
with a focal company surrounded by a number of  satellites at various levels of  trade, comprising 
both upstream suppliers and downstream distributors.31 In practice, this pattern of  outsourcing 
activities has been constantly expanding, ranging from product design to assembly, and from 
research and development to marketing, distribution and after-care service.32 As this pattern of  
core and periphery, which often ignores national boundaries, gradually stabilises through the 
practice of  repetitive contracting, a steady authority relation will be formed under the mantle of  a 
MNE and its smaller overseas business partners. Such authority relations in supply chains are no 
longer necessarily tied to the same forms of  ownership which are found in group companies. As 
remarked by Collins, they may arise “wherever the economic dependence of  one party upon the other effectively 
requires compliance with the dominant party’s wishes.”33 A major MNE may acquire sufficient leverage 
over a supplier in an emerging economy to be in a position to determine its business behaviour in 
practice. Its massive purchasing power, huge market share and the relatively competitive labour 
and product prices it can offer 34  often bolster this authority. From the perspective of  
institutional economics, these group organisations built upon contracts and authority are often 
stable, potentially even reaching the bonding status of  quasi-firms in business reality, with 
individual units comprising distinct legal identities in law.35 However, from the legal perspective 
it is difficult to treat such a group of  business organisations as one unit, or hold a focal company 
                                                             
30 E.g. DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852; Antonio Gramsci Shipping 
Corporation and Others v Stepanovs [2011] EWHC 333; and Atlas Maritime v Avalon Maritime (No.1) [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
563, at 571, per Staughton LJ: “The creation or purchase of a subsidiary company with minimal liability, which will operate with the 
parent’s funds and on the parent’s directions but not expose the parent to liability, may not seem to some the most honest way of trading.” 
However see Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 433; VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corp and Others [2013] 
UKSC 5, and Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, which have since placed DHN and similar judicial attempts 
on shaky ground. 
31 Raja Kali & Javier Reyes, “The Architecture of Globalisation: A Network Approach to International Economic 
Integration” (2007) 38(4) Journal of International Business Relations 595, at 595.  
32 Gene. M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, “Outsourcing in a Global Economy” (2005) 72 Review of Economic Studies 
135, at 135. 
33 Collins, supra note 28, at 734. Cf. Dani Rodrik, “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?” (2000) 14(1) 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 177, at 180, arguing that implicit contracts which are often embedded in domestic social 
networks are scarce in international contexts.  
34 Compared to the labour and material costs in domestic markets, the labour and product prices in emerging 
economies are much more modest. There is also evidence that various patterns of economic integration occur to take 
advantage of possible savings in this regard. According to the World Trade Organisation in 1998, the production of a 
particular “American” car generated only 37% of the production value in the United States, with the rest generated in 
various foreign countries, including Japan, Germany, Taiwan, the UK, Ireland and Barbados. World Trade 
Organisation, Annual Report 1998 (Geneva: World Trade Organisation), at 36. This percentage is likely to be even lower 
twenty years later. See also Collins, supra note 28, at 733 and footnote 12. 
35 Robert G. Eccles, “The Quasifirm in the Construction Industry” (1981) 2 Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organisation 335; Collins, ibid., at 734. This organisational form also to a large extent resembles the “inside contracting 
system” described by Williamson. See Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 
(Free Press, New York, 1975), at 96. 
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liable for the conduct of  its satellite companies, despite their close ties in business practice. Not 
least owing to this reason, the liability regime within a corporate group led by a focal corporation 
is regarded as “one of  the great unsolved problems of  modern company law”.36  
C. Home State Regulatory Developments in Response to Global Outsourcing 
While conventional laws that construct “an atomistic conception of  social relations”37 and delimit one’s 
legal responsibilities in relation to one’s own acts and omissions struggle to encompass the 
complex patterns of  economic integration in the global ambit, novel attempts are increasingly 
being implemented in response to the challenges created by global outsourcing. These so-called 
neo-evolutionary paths presuppose that conventional territorially-based law is static and 
ill-equipped for regulating rapidly changing and increasingly complex social spheres,38 collectively 
calling for further differentiation of  law into specialised areas of  social ordering. The artificiality 
of  an entity’s domicile as a basis for regulation is increasingly recognised, and the reach of  
national legislation, particularly of  home states in relation to their own business entities with 
operations in foreign jurisdictions, has been extending on the basis of  business rather than 
territorial connections. 
 
However, these home state regulatory initiatives are not necessarily integrated. Taking the theme 
of  business and human rights in the UK as an example, there are discrepancies between 
mandatory corporate accountability to protect human rights and voluntary corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, on the basis of  which different regulatory means have 
evolved. For instance, s.54 of  the UK MSA, which requires commercial organisations to disclose 
in their annual slavery statement whether they have made efforts to ensure that slavery and 
human trafficking are not taking place in their global supply chains, and if  so, requiring a 
statement of  the detailed steps taken,39 could be seen as part of  a pioneering attempt to 
advocate businesses’ soft responsibility to respect human rights, as proposed by the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.40 Its general aim is to invite multiple stakeholders in 
global supply chains to assume a regulatory role, setting standards and action protocols for 
human rights protection in their own corporations’ global supply chains.41 Towards this end, 
general norms are set in order to steer primary actors but simultaneously leave them with a 
substantial zone of  freedom to engage in self-regulation; this is evidenced by s.54 leaving 
substantive discretion to corporate actors to determine their own business undertakings, 
including the extent and ways in which they control modern slavery in the course of  their 
operations.42  
 
On the other hand, hard-law duties are inclining in the other direction, towards imposing 
                                                             
36 Clive M. Schmitthoff, ‘Banco Ambrosiano and Modern Company Law’ [1982] Journal of Business Law 363. 
37 Collins, supra note 28, at 731. 
38 Gunther Teubner, “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law” (1983) 17(2) Law & Society Review 239, at 
274. 
39 S.54 (4) of the MSA. 
40 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, supra note 7. 
41 Dara O’Rourke, “Multi-Stakeholder Regulation: Privatising or Socialising Global Labour Standards?” (2006) 34(5) 
World Development 899, at 900. 
42 Michael C. Dorf, “The Domain of Reflexive Law” (2003) 103(2) Columbia Law Review 384, at 384; Wen, supra note 
11, at 347-349. 
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substantive liabilities upon a holding/focal company where necessary, so as to “leave the realm of  
voluntary corporate responsibility for the one of  pure accountability”.43 For instance, a number of  recent 
case judgements in the UK hold that a focal company might be held directly responsible if  
shown to be itself  at fault for sustainability or human rights violations committed by a subsidiary, 
without affecting the company law cornerstone of  separate legal personality.44 In the context of  
global supply chains, this arguably makes it possible to hold a focal firm liable for overseas 
activities of  a subsidiary, or another member of  the same multinational group of  companies 
which is in the downstream of  a supply chain. 
 
As will be discussed below, while these two distinct regulatory approaches have a mutual aim of  
enhancing human rights protection in their home corporations’ global ambit of  influence, they 
lack logical and implementational coherence to “defeat the power of  capital to organise itself  in ways 
which reduce or eliminate liabilities arising from productive activities.”45 This calls for a more systematic 
treatment of  the limits of  legal responsibility by reference to the boundaries of  capital units. 
II. REGULATORY INTERACTION AND DISRUPTIONS TO SUPPLY CHAIN 
DISCLOSURE 
The latest legal developments in supply chain transparency and benchmarking initiatives, 
represented by s.54 of  the UK MSA, offer a novel solution to the capital boundary problem. S.54 
captures the idea of  integral economic control which binds a group of  companies together, 
without rendering the concept of  legal entity useless. One primary legislative aim of  this type of  
supply chain disclosure laws, as identified by Sarfaty, is to “deploy multinational companies to regulate 
themselves and indirectly regulate other firms in their supply chain”.46 On 4 October 2017 the UK 
Government released Updated Guidance on the corporate reporting obligation in the MSA, 
which is fully demonstrative of  the ‘best practice’ approach represented by s.54, i.e. encouraging 
rather than obligating companies to produce more detailed and practical MSA statements.47 
 
Laudable legislative intent notwithstanding, it appears that the construction of  s.54 is based upon 
two premises, which are both to a large extent assumptions. First, as noted in Justice Brandeis’ 
famous line “Sunshine is the best of  disinfectants”,48 lawmakers believe that it will be more difficult 
for commercial organisations to deny their own guilt or overlook their own idleness if  they 
openly disclose their affairs and place them under market and public scrutiny, thereby obliquely 
facilitating the enhancement of  human rights protection at the institutional level.49 Second, there 
                                                             
43 Ramona Elisabeta Cirlig, “Business and Human Rights: From Soft Law to Hard Law” (2016) 6(2) Juridical Tribune 
228, at 228. 
44 The most notable is Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 3111. See also infra notes 51-64 and 
relevant texts. 
45 Collins, supra note 28, at 738. 
46 Sarfaty, supra note 17, at 435. 
47 Wen, supra note 11, at 347-9. 
48 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It (1914, reprinted by Martino Fine Books, 2009), at 
92. 
49 As in the words of Arnold Schwarzenegger, the California State Governor, when promoting the California 
Transparency in Supply Chain act: “This will increase transparency, allow consumers to get more information and make more choices 
and motivate businesses to ensure humane practices… Of course this is not a silver bullet, by any means, but what it does is, it really makes 




is also an inherent belief  that businesses would be incentivised to disclose their efforts to combat 
modern slavery, as this information would demonstrate their proactive efforts to eradicate this 
social ill and thereby generate more reputation-related benefits.50  
 
Leaving aside the first assumption, which is outside the scope of  this paper, it is possible to take 
issue with the second assumption. When information about combating modern slavery in a 
group context might lead to civil claims for reparation, or even claims on criminal grounds, it is 
hard to imagine that any business would accept this risk and make a full disclosure. Taking into 
consideration recent common law developments on corporations’ tort liability in the context of  
group companies, such risks may well turn into reality. In respect of  tortious liability, English 
courts have recognised that the modern degree of  economic integration merits the adoption of  a 
more flexible approach to territorial jurisdiction and even group responsibility, using a pattern of  
authority and domination to overcome the capital boundary problem. As will be examined below, 
this separation from the conventional requirement of  ownership opens up the possibility of  
charging liabilities not only in parent-subsidiary relations but also between companies without 
share ownership links, which are often observed in supply chain contexts. 
 
A. Potential Tort Liability for Focal Companies in Global Supply Chains 
 
Distinguishing territory from jurisdiction is not completely new under English law. As evidenced 
in the trajectory of  tort liability for focal companies, it began with Lubbe and others v Cape plc,51 
and reached maturity in Chandler v Cape.52 The claimant Mr. Chandler was employed by Cape 
Building Products Ltd, a subsidiary of  the defendant company Cape Plc (hereinafter Cape). The 
claimant, who worked in a factory with open sides which emitted dust, contracted asbestosis fifty 
years later. Both the High Court and the Court of  Appeal supported Mr. Chandler’s claim that 
there was a duty of  care on the part of  Cape to the employees of  the subsidiary company to 
advise on, or to ensure, a safe system of  work for them, on the basis of  an assumption of  
responsibility derived from the three-stage test in Caparo.53 Given (1) that the business of  the 
holding company and subsidiary are in all relevant respects the same; (2) the state of  Cape’s 
knowledge about the subsidiary’s work; (3) Cape’s superior knowledge of  the nature and 
management of  asbestos risks, and; (4) that Cape knew, or ought to have foreseen, that the 
subsidiary or its employees would rely on it using its superior knowledge for the employees’ 
protection,54 it was held that the claimant had established a sufficient degree of  proximity to the 
                                                             
50 As stated by Andrew Wallis (CEO of Unseen UK) during the Parliamentary debate: “Fundamentally, (the requirement of 
slavery disclosure statement) should be viewed not as red tape but as a measure to protect British business.” Andrew Wallis, House of 
Commons Committee Debate First Sitting, 21 July 2014. 
51 [2000] 1 WLR 1545. 
52 Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 3111. 
53 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. The three ingredients for determining whether a situation gives rise 
to a duty of care include that the damage should be foreseeable, that there should exist a relationship of proximity 
between the party owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed, and that the situation should be one in which the 
court considers it fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of a given scope upon the one party for the benefit of the 
other. Ibid., at 618, per Lord Bridge. 
54 This was satisfied on the basis of the fact that throughout the claimant’s employment period Cape had employed a 
group medical advisor and a scientific officer in seeking ways of suppressing asbestos dust, and many aspects of the 
subsidiary’s production process had been discussed and authorised by the defendant’s board. 
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defendant company for it to be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of  care on Cape to 
protect the claimant from harm from asbestos in the atmosphere.55 In particular, the Court of  
Appeal emphasised that it was not necessary to show that the holding company was in the habit 
of  intervening in the health and safety policies of  the subsidiary; evidence showing “that the parent 
has a practice of  intervening in the trading operations of  the subsidiary, for example production and funding issues” 
would suffice for the purpose of  (4).56  
 
In point of  fact, Chandler is often held as a precedent or “a source of  inspiration” for the imposition 
of  a duty of  care on the focal company of  a multinational for the health and safety of  employees 
and others affected by the acts and omissions of  an overseas subsidiary.57 This has been realised 
by the courts’ elastic interpretation of  proximity in business relations. As Arden LJ stated, the 
development of  the law of  negligence has to be incremental.58 The conceptual elasticity of  
“proximity” has already been explicitly acknowledged on several occasions in English law. As Lord 
Oliver pointed out in Caparo: “’Proximity’ … embraces not a definable concept but merely a description of  
circumstances in which, pragmatically, the courts conclude that a duty of  care exists.”59 In Chandler v Cape, the 
Court of  Appeal explicitly rejected the defendant’s argument that the duty of  care can only exist 
if  the parent company has absolute control of  the subsidiary,60 implying the enlarged scope of  
the duty and the far-reaching potential of  the Caparo test.61 The possibility of  a wider scope of  
application of  the Caparo test was further reaffirmed by Tomlinson LJ in David Thompson v the 
Renwick Group plc,62 where he stipulated that “[i]t is clear that Arden LJ intended this formulation to be 
descriptive of  circumstances in which a duty might be imposed rather than exhaustive of  the circumstances in which 
a duty may be imposed.” 
 
The legitimate provenance of  finding a focal company tortiously liable for its subsidiaries, who 
may well be its suppliers in a global supply chain, is further extended by the Lungowe judgement.63 
The Court of  Appeal stipulated in this case that a UK holding company’s duty of  care may, in 
certain circumstances, extend not only to employees of  a subsidiary but also to third parties 
affected by a subsidiary’s operations, including subsidiaries that are not wholly owned. Although 
it remains to be seen how these claims will be determined on their merits, the Court explicitly 
emphasised that the fact that there had never been a reported case in this regard did not make 
such a claim unarguable.64  
                                                             
55 Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 3111, at [80], per Arden LJ. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ugljesa Grusic, “Responsibilities in Groups of Companies and the Future of International Human Rights and 
Environmental Litigation” (2015) 74(1) Cambridge Law Journal 30, at 33. 
58 Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 3111, at [63], per Arden LJ.  
59 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 633, per Lord Oliver. 
60 Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 3111, at [66], per Arden LJ. 
61 As stated, “[i]t is simply not possible to say in all cases what is or is not a normal incident of that relationship… The question is 
simply whether what the … company did amounted to taking on a direct duty (of care)…”Ibid., at [67] and [70], per Arden LJ. 
62 [2014] EWCA Civ 635, para 33, per Tomlinson LJ. The claimant’s claim was only rejected in this case on the 
grounds that the holding company did not carry on any business at all apart from holding shares in other companies, 
and that there was no evidence that the holding company either did have or should have had any knowledge of the risk 
superior to that which the subsidiaries could be expected to have. Ibid., para 38, per Tomlinson LJ. 
63 Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc [2017] EWCA Civ 1528; [2018] 1 W.L.R. 3575. 
64 “If it were otherwise the law would never change.” Ibid., at [88], per Simon LJ. 
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B. Regulatory Interactions between Tortious Liabilities of  the Focal Company and 
Supply Chain Disclosure  
 
While the Caparo test has only been successfully applied thus far to holding companies in relation 
to their subsidiaries’ health and safety offences, this is significant enough to cause disruption in 
the enforcement of  s.54, given that group companies are a common pattern in global outsourcing. 
The ascription of  responsibility application would also likely have significant implications for 
supply chain management, which often involve similarly subtle arrangements of  agency and 
collateral contracts. In particular, the four elements that Arden LJ emphasised in affirming the 
assumption of  responsibility could equally apply to supply chain relationships, particularly in big 
MNEs which have power and “a practice of  intervening in the trading operations”65 of  their trading 
partners within supply chains. It is at least arguable that within a supply chain, a company with 
strong influence/control upon its upstream subsidiary suppliers may owe a duty of  care to 
victims if  its suppliers commit modern slavery offences, upon the satisfaction of  the three-part 
Caparo test of  foreseeability, proximity and reasonableness. S.54 of  the MSA suggests that a 
qualifying corporation should disclose includes information on “the organisation’s structure, its 
business and its supply chains”66 and “the parts of  its business and supply chains where there is a risk of  
slavery and human trafficking taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess and manage that risk”.67 This 
disclosure would conveniently constitute direct evidence for potential claimants against the focal 
company in proving foreseeability and proximity, given that the suppliers, under repetitive 
contracts with and the authority of  the focal company, will also likely rely upon the focal 
company deploying its superior knowledge or expertise in avoiding modern slavery.68  
 
The evidential significance of  sustainability reports published by corporations, including reports 
involving modern slavery information, in establishing proximity and reasonableness was clearly 
stipulated by Lord Bingham in Lubbe and others v Cape plc.69 As mentioned, the main issue of  
determining the liability of  a parent company involves the control that it exercises over and the 
advice it gives to its subsidiary company. Much of  the evidence presented to any such enquiry 
would, in the ordinary way, “be documentary and much of  it would be found in the offices of  the parent 
company, including minutes of  meetings, reports by directors and employees on visits overseas and 
correspondence.”70 Considering the four factors that the Court of  Appeal explicated in Chandler v 
Cape, one would expect that the last three of  the required elements, including the parent’s 
superior knowledge of  the risk, are all likely to be satisfied if  the parent corporation provides 
details about “the parts of  its business and supply chains where there is a risk of  slavery and human trafficking 
                                                             
65 Chandler v Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525; [2012] 1 WLR 3111, at [80], per Arden LJ. 
66 S. 54(5)(a) of MSA. 
67 S. 54(5)(d) of MSA. 
68 While some might challenge on the ground that England and Wales is not the proper place in which to bring such a 
claim, the argument can often be refuted on the ground that the claimant(s) cannot obtain access to justice in the 
forum where the foreign subsidiary/supplier is located. For instance, Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc [2017] EWCA Civ 
1528; [2018] 1 WLR. 3575, at [103]-[107], per Simon LJ; also supra notes 31-36 for discussions on the authority of a 
focal firm in supply chain contexts. 




taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess and manage that risk” as required by s.54 of  the MSA.71  
 
Practice has already seen real reparation claims following corporations’ modern slavery 
disclosures. A recent class action suit was filed by a consumer against the US retailing giant 
Costco and several of  its suppliers, claiming that the presence of  forced labour in its seafood 
supply chain is contradictory to the statements made under the provisions of  the Supply Chain 
Transparency Act.72 A similar class action was also brought against Nestlé.73 Under such 
circumstances, the realisation of  the legislative intent of  supply chain disclosure regulation is 
likely to be disrupted, and corporations’ incentives to disclose comprehensive and extensive 
information would be reduced; when a detailed disclosure of  supply chain management and 
control of  modern slavery might potentially lead to direct liability in supply chains, it is 
predictable that focal companies subject to s.54 will be tempted to make a tick-the-box disclosure 
only, or even simply deny any action on or knowledge of  modern slavery in their supply chains. 
In both cases they will have fulfilled their statutory duty of  disclosure as a commercial 
organisation, and will be regarded as having properly disclosed under s.54 by simply stating that 
they have taken no relevant action during the financial year.74 Given the additional risk of  
reputational damage, commercial organisations and people who are the directing mind and will 
of  these companies75 will, at the very least, be cautious about what to disclose when the 
information might be used as evidence, thereby putting themselves at future risk. As stated by 
New, “Forced labour is an issue of  such legal gravity that continued, knowing engagement could constitute direct 
complicity in criminal behaviour, a much more serious situation for the firm than ‘mere’ reputational damage.”76 
One may thus see potentially perverse incentives for corporations not to regulate their supply 
chains, or fear of  generating the factum for a cause of  action in tort, although as a matter of  
policy the law does not intend to encourage such wilful passiveness among corporations.77 
C. Developments on Cross-Border Corporate Sustainability and the Evidential 
Implications of  Supply Chain Disclosure 
1. The Evidential Value of  Corporate Disclosure Documents 
 
A line of  recent case judgements,78 in particular Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc79 and Okpabi v. 
                                                             
71 S.54 (5)(d) of MSA. 
72 Sud v Costco Wholesale Corporation (ND Cal. No 15-cv-03783-JSW, 15 January 2016). SK Rathke, “Litigation Fallout 
from All This Supply Chain Transparency Legislation (or, These Things Have Teeth!) (or, the Cycle of Misfortune)” 
(2015) National Law Review August 27th  
73 Barber v Nestlé USA Inc. (CD Cal. No SACV15-01364-CJC (AGRx). 9 December 2015. These two legal actions did 
not make substantive headway. 
74 S.54 of MSA. 
75 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v Nattrass [1971] UKHL 1. 
76 New, supra note 17, at 698. 
77 Turner, supra note 15, at 10. 
78 In AAA & Others v Unilever Plc & Anor [2018] ECWA Civ 1532, regardless of the High Court Judge Elisabeth Laing 
J’s decision that there was a sufficient degree of proximity, and although there was inadequate foreseeability or 
reasonableness to establish viable claims against Unilever, the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that the appeal 
should be dismissed by reason of the proximity point in relation to Unilever, and it is pointless to consider issues of 
foreseeability and reasonableness in terms of the imposition of a duty of care.  
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Royal Dutch Shell plc,80 further consolidate the significant evidential effect of  public documents on 
cross-border corporate sustainability. These cases currently concern the establishment of  
jurisdiction only: overseas claimants, as third parties allegedly harmed by a subsidiary’s local 
operations, are trying to establish the English courts’ jurisdiction to try claims against parent 
companies and their overseas subsidiaries. However, these jurisdiction claims merit an 
examination of  the substance of  the case, and thereby require consideration of  whether there 
was some plausible case between the overseas claimants and the holding company,81 involving a 
purportedly simple question of  law that Caparo and Chandler were trying to solve: whether an 
English parent company owes a duty of  care to those affected by a subsidiary’s overseas 
operations.82  
 
In both Lungowe and Okpabi the claimants relied on the sustainability reports disclosed by the 
defendants, implicating the potential evidential effects of  the modern slavery reports required by 
s.54 in establishing the human rights liabilities of  parent corporations. For instance, in Lungowe 
the public report issued by the Vedanta company, entitled “Embedding Sustainability”, contained 
information about the Board of  Vedanta exercising oversight of  all Vedanta’s subsidiaries, and 
referred to problems with discharges into water as an example.83 There were also highlights in 
Vedanta’s public statements regarding its commitment to address environmental risks and 
technical shortcomings in the subsidiary’s mining infrastructure. These are the kind of  
standardised statement that one often finds in corporate reports on sustainability issues – for 
instance, the statement that “we have a governance framework to ensure that surface and ground water do not 
get contaminated by our operations”.84 However, they were relied upon by the plaintiff, and supported 
by the Court of  Appeal, as part of  the evidence that the parent company Vedanta had either 
taken direct responsibility or had controlled the operations which had given rise to the claim.85  
 
Likewise, in Okpabi the claimants relied on the contents of  several Sustainability Reports 
published by the defendant company, highlighting the commitment of  the parent company to 
control and direct the subsidiary’s environmental performance. Although the Court of  Appeal 
rejected the claimants’ argument by a 2-1 majority, the evidential value of  public reports issued by 
the defendant company was explicitly acknowledged by all appellate judges. Simon LJ, who was 
among the majority, emphasised that he “would accept that statements made in the … Sustainability 
Report were particularly relevant to the existence of  the duty of  care relied on by the claimants.”86 Likewise, Sir 
Geoffrey Vos opined that the regulatory text (that puts forward disclosure standards) means that 
such statements “are more likely to be true, and so should be accorded greater evidential weight.”87  
                                                                                                                                                                              
79 [2017] EWCA Civ 1528. 
80 [2018] EWCA Civ 191. 
81 “In general, a real issue between the relevant parties is to be equated with a properly arguable case or serious question to be tried… The 
more doubtful the point of law, the more cautious the court should be, since the question of law goes to the existence of the jurisdiction” 
Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc [2017] EWCA Civ 1528; [2018] 1 WLR 3575, at [63], per Simon LJ. 
82 Such a duty of  care may arise where the parent company: (a) has taken direct responsibility for devising a material 
health and safety policy; or (b) controls the operations which give rise to the claim. In these cases the Court of  Appeal 
used the three-part formulation (foreseeability, proximity, and reasonableness) set out by the House of  Lords in Caparo 
Industries plc v Dickman, to see whether a properly arguable claim that a duty of  care was owed in the particular case 
could be established. 
83 Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc [2017] EWCA Civ 1528; [2018] 1 W.L.R. 3575.at [84](1), per Simon LJ. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., at [84]-[90], per Simon LJ. 
86 [2018] EWCA Civ 191, at [67], per Simon LJ. 




Furthermore, as evidenced in Okpabi, it still remains debatable as to the extent to which the 
disclosed information would be deemed specific enough to establish proximity between the 
entities, and the evidential value of  corporate disclosure, including modern slavery reports, in 
establishing the focal company’s duty of  care might turn out to be even more significant. For 
instance, based on exactly the same facts on which Simon LJ and Sir Geoffrey Vos rejected the 
appeal, Sales LJ adopted a more contextual approach when considering the issue of  proximity 
and was in favour of  allowing an appeal:88 “…on the facts of  a particular case, the issuing of  mandatory 
instructions combined with close monitoring, intervention and enforcement, may show that there has been a 
material assumption of  responsibility.”89 In Sale LJ’s opinion in Okpabi, the group-wide instructions 
issued by RDS provided a practical means for RDS to disseminate expertise and to control at 
least some aspects of  the management of  its operating companies, which helped the claimants to 
assert an arguable claim that RDS assumed a material degree of  responsibility in relation to the 
management of  the pipeline and facilities according to the criteria in Chandler and Lungowe. In 
particular, the fact that the losses due to oil spillage in Nigeria were singled out in the Shell 
Sustainability Report 2014 was construed as strong evidence that the parent “had a particularly 
strong interest in ensuring that the management of  the pipeline and facilities was conducted effectively and thus was 
proactive in assuming control of  the operational decisions about how to manage the risk of  oil and spillage from 
them”.90  
 
2. Extended Corporate Proximity from Ownership to Authority 
 
In the Okpabi case, the fact that the parent company did not directly hold shares in the subsidiary 
was considered irrelevant in establishing the duty of  care of  the parent company, since the parent 
could still exert practical control over the subsidiary.91 This is an explicit sign of  English courts 
starting to depart from the conventional emphasis on ownership in groups towards authority 
when establishing proximity, and focusing more on whether the group is managed integrally 
along functional lines. For instance, the existence of  global standards within a company group 
was considered by Sales LJ as capable of  providing a mechanism for the projection of  real 
practical executive control by the parent’s CEO and key organs over the affairs of  the subsidiary, 
if  they wished to assume such control.92 This is an additional warning sign to corporations 
operating using forms of  authority bonding, which often occurs in supply chains. Predictably, the 
evidential value of  public information disclosed by the company in establishing a holding 
company’s duty of  care largely remains a matter of  detailed factual analysis, which will only make 
MNEs more careful in choosing and formulating their methods and the content of  their 
                                                                                                                                                                              
to allow the claim because they felt the disclosed corporate policies and documents were not specifically targeting the 
subsidiary company, and thus only showed that a parent company had taken steps to ensure that there were proper 
control mechanisms in place over all subsidiaries. Nevertheless, there might be an arguable case if relevant corporate 
policies and processes were more specific, demonstrating the parent’s endeavours to exercise control over a particular 
subsidiary. 
88 [2012] EWCA Civ 525; [2012] 1 WLR 3111. 
89 [2018] EWCA Civ 191, at [172], per Sales LJ. 
90 Ibid., at [162], per Sales LJ. 
91 Ibid., at [172], per Sales LJ. 
92 [2018] EWCA Civ 191, at [161], per Sales LJ. 
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disclosure, thereby largely thwarting the legislative purpose of  s.54. 
 
This area of  law is far from being consolidated, since the claimants in Okpabi and the defendants 
in Lungowe are both seeking to appeal to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, however, based on 
existing case judgements it seems that the more a company becomes involved in the control and 
publication of  information about its overseas connected companies’ operations, the more likely it 
is to be plunged into litigation and held liable for negligence by overseas subsidiaries and 
companies connected through supply contracts. Thus far, connections acknowledged by judicial 
authorities have been confined to those between parents and subsidiaries, but this type of  
parent-subsidiary connection often exists in supply chains. There even remains the possibility of  
this type of  connection extending to close upstream-downstream supply chain partners, if  it is 
possible to demonstrate the necessary degree of  foreseeability, proximity and reasonableness.93 
 
3. The Enforcement Tension between the Extraterritorial Duty of  Care and Supply 
Chain Disclosure 
 
A significant tension is therefore evident in the trajectory of  the latest case law developments: 
MNEs in general, and particularly under supply chain disclosure regulation, are encouraged to 
construct and implement measures to prevent their suppliers/subsidiaries from engaging in 
human rights abuses. However, there also exists a risk that the imposition and enforcement of  
such measures could be construed as the focal companies’ control of  and/or acceptance of  
responsibility for the operations of  that subsidiary/supplier.94 Existing laws on the duty of  care 
for parent corporations place significant emphasis on the nature of  the working relationships 
between business entities, in which documentary evidence issued by the entities plays an 
important role. In this regard, Lungowe and Okpabi provided clear examples of  how detailed 
sustainability disclosure can backfire; the evidence, in which Sustainability Reports played a key 
part, was considered to support the case that “there was a pattern of  distribution of  expertise and control 
in relation to the handling of  the risk of  oil spills in (Nigeria)”.95 
 
To make things even more complicated, the disputable status of  the law increases the likelihood 
of  similar future claims against MNEs, seeking to rely on documents issued by the corporations 
themselves which are available in the public domain. Hopes have been raised that claims 
originally brought against subsidiaries may be brought before the courts of  their parent 
companies’ home states and remedies may be sought in that jurisdiction. Although judgements in 
                                                             
93 Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2018] EWCA Civ 191, at [24], per Simon LJ, “It is clear that the three-part test set out in the 
Caparo case is not a forensic equation to which values may be attached that yield the answer to whether or not a duty is owed”. 
94 Chris Owen & Adam Bristow, Okpabi v Shell Appeal Highlights Important Points regarding Parent Company Liability, 28 
February 2018, available at 
http://www.elexica.com/en/legal-topics/dispute-resolution-commercial/260218-okpabi-v-shell.  
95 [2018] EWCA Civ 191, at [165], per Sales LJ. Sales LJ also explained why judges tend to attach significance to public 
disclosure – it has evidently not been easy for claimants to find internal witnesses (from the defendant company) who 
were willing to act in a certain sense as whistleblowers. Ibid., at [168]. 
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the Court of  Appeal96 in two recent cases denied access to courts in parent companies’ home 
states for the victims of  extraterritorial human rights violations, the evidential value of  public 
reports including sustainability information was widely appreciated. It is likely that as long as the 
law is not completely clarified and the possibility of  focal companies being dragged into lawsuits 
remains, MNEs will continue to be deterred from issuing detailed sustainability reports with 
details, since such hearings are costly in terms of  both time and expenditure. Lord Neuberger 
warned in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp97 about the risk of  vexatious litigations if  a 
hearing is expensive and time-consuming.98 Unfortunately, the expenditure of  time, effort and 
financial resources in recent jurisdiction disputes has been significant, to the extent that they 
became “wholly self-defeating”99. For instance, in the Okpabi case the total length of  the witness 
statements ran to over 2000 pages of  material, and the parties’ ‘skeleton arguments’ ran to 259 
pages.100 The cost and effort burdens on MNEs will incentivise them to avoid this type of  
litigation, and information disclosed in public documents which might be used as evidence 
against them will therefore be brief  and concise. Given that s.54 of  the MSA imposes no penalty 
for poor-quality disclosure, corporations that wish to avoid public disapproval are likely to 
disclose minimal or selective information in an indirect and non-confrontational manner, rather 
than straightforward opposition and failure to disclose.101 
III. INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO SUPPLY CHAIN DISCLOSURE 
A. Structural and Compositional Intricacies of  Supply Chains 
As well as its incompatibilities with regulatory approaches to extraterritorial tortious liability, s.54 
of  the MSA is also restrained in practice by institutional barriers, not least the structural and 
compositional complications of  supply chains. Most of  the supply chain and modern slavery 
literature concentrates on criminal behaviour occurring in goods and services supply chains. 
Likewise, s.54 in its current form does not distinguish between product supply chains and labour 
supply chains. However, the complex channels of  labour supply – contract employment agencies, 
local gangmasters, and the fact that they often provide people to work for a company without 
being counted as direct employees – tend to get around supply chain governance and labour 
standards, taking advantage of  legislative ambiguity in the terms “supplier” and “employee”.102 
Under pressure to engage in responsible business practices, many companies spend vast sums of  
money on tracing the source of  their products and making their product supply chains 
transparent. However, the stark reality is that labour chains remain invisible for the most part. As 
shown by empirical evidence in the field, many businesses experience pragmatic difficulties in 
detecting modern slavery practices in their labour chains.103 The high structural volatility of  
                                                             
96 Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2018] EWCA Civ 191; AAA & Others v Unilever Plc & Anor [2018] ECWA Civ 1532. 
97 [2013] 2 AC 337, at [82]. 
98 As emphasised, it is important that “…hearings concerning the issue of appropriate forum should not involve masses of documents, 
long witness statements, detailed analysis of the issues and long argument…”[2013] 2 AC 337, at [82]. 
99 [2018] EWCA Civ 191, at [21], per Simon LJ. 
100 Ibid., at [17], per Simon LJ. 
101 Also LeBaron & Rühmkorf, supra note 9, at 8-10, arguing that s.54 of the UK MSA itself was a result of 
corporations’ displacement efforts during the policy-making process. 
102 New, supra note 17, at 699. For instance, the precise conceptual boundaries of forced labour may vary, the 
extremist view being that all workers under a capitalism regime are wage slaves. Marxism is the stereotypical example 
of this. 
103 In Crane and LeBaron’s research into modern slavery, a senior executive of a major British hotel chain admitted 
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global value chains has already been shown to have a significant impact on the actual operating 
effects of  corporate policies, in some circumstances even rendering them unfit for purpose.104 In 
the meantime, multi-tier supply chains, and the complex systems of  transnational managerial 
control through which they operate, were ignored in the legislative drafting of  s.54, deliberately 
or otherwise. If  one takes a close look at the wording of  s.54 of  the MSA, the term ‘supply chain’ 
is not clearly defined for the purpose of  this provision, with the consequence that the scope of  
the suppliers covered by corporate policies and actions is not at all clear.105  
 
In this regard, a comparable provision – s. 1714.43(a)(1) of  the Californian Civil Code – avoids 
confusion by clearly targeting a “direct supply chain for tangible goods offered for sale”. Some 
argue that s.54’s omission of  the adjective “direct” implicates the UK legislators’ intention to 
accommodate a broader reach than the Californian peer. 106 Indeed, practice has thus far 
supported the need to expand legislative reach; modern slavery problems frequently occur 
upstream at the less visible sub-supplier levels, rather than at the focal company or among the 
first-tier suppliers with whom a focal firm has direct contractual relationships.107 However, this is 
only scholarly speculation rather than an authoritative interpretation. The enforceability of  s.54, 
at least at present, is significantly undermined by these conceptual and scope ambiguities. As 
commented by O’Neill, proclamations about combating crimes including modern slavery without 
establishing or identifying institutions where corresponding claims for rights or redress may be 
lodged are, at best, “a premature rhetoric of  rights (that) may have political point and impact … (and) at 
worst a rhetoric of  rights can inflate expectations while masking a lack of  claimable entitlements.”108 
 
B. Limits of  the Focal Company in Sustainable Chain Management 
Behind the supply chain governance initiatives and the growing body of  research suggesting that 
focal companies should expand their sustainability strategies to the sub-suppliers’ level109 lies 
another implicit assumption, which is that focal companies are able to affect or even manage 
their sub-suppliers’ practices.110 From the perspective of  buying firms, this “chain liability effect”111 
demands that their sustainability management strategies penetrate as far as second-tier suppliers 
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and even beyond. This assumption should not be taken for granted, as the complexity of  supply 
chains also affects the capacity and quality of  sustainable supply chain management by the focal 
company. To begin with, the lack of  contractual relationships between a buying firm and its 
second-tier suppliers, coupled with asymmetric information on the exact number or identity of  
its sub-suppliers,112 often render the focal company’s practice of  implementing sustainability 
strategies at sub-supplier levels difficult. Focal companies are usually located in developed 
economies, whereas sub-suppliers are in emerging economies. The multi-dimensional 
geographical, regulatory and cultural distances between a focal company and its sub-suppliers, 
combined with limited resource availability at the first-tier supplier’s level, which often serve as 
agent of  the focal company, further compound the challenge of  achieving sustainable goals in 
supply chains.113 Up to the present, managing sub-suppliers in the context of  sustainability and 
human rights protection is still the exception rather than the norm,114 and the extent of  supply 
chain management also varies significantly, affected by power asymmetries as well as 
dependencies between supply chain members for critical resources or components.115  
 
Second, the strategies that focal companies use to manage sub-suppliers also differ significantly, 
ranging from delegating authority to tier 1 suppliers where there is no direct connection between 
the buying firm and the tier 2 supplier,116 to working with third parties in extending sustainability 
to sub-suppliers, 117  and to forming “closed triads” in which buying firms directly manage 
sub-suppliers.118 The holistic implementation of  practices beyond the boundaries of  a buying 
firm is thus characterised by wide diversities in the focal company’s power, the industry in which 
the supply chain resides, the number and location of  production facilities, infrastructural 
characteristics in transportation and telecommunications, the extent of  public scrutiny, and the 
extent of  dependency and distance between supply chain members, which will need to be taken 
into account in future law-making.119 
 
C. Impacts of  the General Socio-Economic Environment 
Other than the complexities of  supply chains discussed above, the social complexities and 
dangers that might be involved in disclosing modern slavery in the global context may also deter 
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efficient and full disclosure. Modern slavery, particularly in the form of  human trafficking and 
forced labour, is a process rather than an isolated event, often involving the participation of  
criminal gangs who may use threats and various means of  violence to prevent their crimes from 
being disclosed.120 Just as acutely noted by Quirk, “(modern slavery) does not denote a uniform condition, 
but covers a spectrum of  practices, involving varying degrees of  consent, coercion, treatment, and autonomy”.121 
Rather than seeing modern slavery as an exogenous problem that companies have to address, it 
should be seen as an endemic feature of  socio-economic systems that are partly constituted by 
the companies themselves.122 Imposing disclosure obligations on companies without tackling the 
socio-economic contexts in which modern slavery develops will not help much in fully 
eradicating the social ill. 
IV. DATA-BASED EVIDENCE 
Given the multi-faceted elements that interact with and disrupt the implementation of  statutory 
disclosure requirements, it is unlikely that s.54 of  the MSA will have a substantial effect in 
incentivising focal companies to make detailed and accurate disclosure about their anti-slavery 
performance in supply chains. This has been proved by empirical evidence. Up to 16 October 
2018, of  the 18,299 UK companies exceeding the £36 million annual turnover threshold,123 less 
than one third – 5893 companies – submitted reports to the Modern Slavery Registry, and only 
19% of  the submitted reports met all the minimum requirements set out in the MSA.124 If  these 
disappointing figures can to a certain extent be excused by the fact that it is not mandatory to 
disclose on the Registry’s website, a closer look at the contents of  MSA reports is just as 
unsatisfactory. The Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC) assessed the first 
year’s MSA Reports released by FTSE 100 companies, and concluded that “(while) there is a welcome 
cluster of  leading companies taking robust action … the majority show a lacklustre response to the MSA at best”. 
In other research targeting reports submitted by companies operating in sectors that are widely 
recognised as a heightened risk, almost two thirds did not make reference to the specific risks of  
slavery and human trafficking in relevant supply chains or specific sectors.125 Without correct 
identification of  the risks, it will be difficult for firms to take effective action to address those 
risks. Many statements are not even compliant with the basic requirements of  the legislation, with 
the majority not addressing the six topic areas listed in s.54 in any detail.126 In general, firms tend 
to allege that they are against modern slavery and forbid their suppliers from engaging in it. In 
many cases, firms assert that their prohibition must be cascaded down the chain of  production, 
going beyond the first tier of  supplying firms. However, this kind of  assertion tends to be 
restricted to the policy level – few companies thus far have disclosed their or their suppliers’ 
previous involvement in modern slavery, even if  passive or unrecognised. Company policies also 
tend to be highly uniform and relatively abstract, revealing little information about their actual 
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performance. This has been described by Coombs and Halladay as a “pseudo-panopticon”.127 The 
conventional corporate policy and monitoring regime has thus far proved only to provide room 
for manipulation and game-playing128 in responding to less challenging environmental issues in 
supply chains, not to mention dealing with the much more severe problem of  modern slavery.  
V. SUGGESTIONS 
Although the ascription of  responsibility has thus far primarily focused on group companies and 
depends on the individual circumstances in each case, including the nature, scope and extent of  
the holding company’s control, these legal developments still have significant implications for 
supply chain management, which often involve similarly subtle arrangements of  agency and 
collateral contracts. From the home state regulatory perspective, this requires the 
acknowledgement of  modern forms of  corporate integration, so as to develop a coherent 
regulatory approach that defines the extent of  the human rights responsibilities (accountability) 
of  focal companies. In order to solve the regulatory and institutional tensions discussed above, 
the experiences of  several other jurisdictions might be of  referential value to the UK, both in 
reconciling corporate disclosure and other regulatory initiatives, and in enhancing the 
extraterritorial reach of  home states towards their companies’ overseas supply chains, as 
explicated below. 
 
To begin with, eradicating modern slavery not only requires the improvement of  regulatory 
standards in relation to disclosure, wages, working conditions and collective bargaining rights in 
both home and host countries, but also demands the effective detection of  modern slavery in the 
first place. S.54 of  the MSA does not dictate the content of  corporate disclosures, instead merely 
providing guidance as to what information may be included in an organisation’s slavery and 
human trafficking statement,129 which enables corporations to formulate their statements in ways 
beneficial to them. In this regard, the transparency required by the Californian Act seems to be 
more robust – each eligible retail seller or manufacturer must, at a minimum, disclose to what 
extent, if  any, that he does each of  the following: the verification of  product supply chains to 
evaluate risks of  slavery; conducting audits of  suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance with 
corporate standards; requiring direct suppliers’ certification of  material compliance; maintaining 
internal accountability standards for employees or contractors, as well as procedures for those 
who fail to meet the standards; and the provision of  training for employees and managers who 
have direct responsibility for supply chain management.130 Of  course, corporations can tick “no” 
to all the above questions, but then the disclosure statement will presumably become evidence in 
a “name and shame” exposure. 
 
Complex patterns of  economic integration in contemporary groups and supply chains also 
consist of  more than one form of  bond – for example, ownership, authority and contract – 
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which the law needs to take into full account in order to develop principles accordingly. For 
instance, a repetitive pattern of  contracting for essentially the same goods or services should 
suffice as evidence of  a significant degree of  economic integration which may warrant a 
disclosure. Furthermore, this should not be limited to repetitive bilateral contracts, since multiple 
relations may operate in these massively integrated networks.131 Further clarification is also 
necessary in terms of  sufficient degrees of  proximity and control in the Caparo test, so that 
disclosure regulation would well integrate with the hard law duty of  care. In this regard, in France, 
disclosure of  human rights protection activities has now become part of  an integral framework 
of  corporate duties that corporations must adhere to, rather than an isolated undertaking that 
corporations have the discretion to ignore.132 An amendment to the French Commercial Code 
creates an obligation for companies to prevent and mitigate environmental, health and human 
rights harms resulting from their activities, including those carried out by their subsidiaries and 
supply chains.133 This duty is composed of  three elements (stages), including elaboration, 
disclosure, and the effective implementation of  a ‘vigilance plan’, 134 which should include 
“reasonable vigilance measures to adequately identify risks and prevent serious violations of  human rights … 
health and safety and the environment”.135 In a corporate group, the duty could be imposed on the 
holding company to monitor and ensure that the vigilance plan is complied with within the 
sphere of  influence. Policies and measures to address extraterritorial challenges should appear in 
the vigilance plan in order to avoid unnecessary risks, including potential tort liability. Good 
corporate practice of  more information gathering and sharing would therefore not necessarily 
affect the arm’s length relationship between companies and their suppliers. 
 
Given their increasingly important role in global governance, a regulatory environment 
incentivising MNEs to engage in self-observance and the effective governance of  human rights 
in their extraterritorial activities will also be necessary, until such time as (and even after) MNEs 
become directly legally accountable for their human rights abuses. In this regard, the Illegal 
Logging Prohibition Act 2012 (ILP Act) in Australia provides a novel supplementary regulation 
mode. Instead of  directly targeting wrongdoers who are engaged in illegal logging activities in a 
foreign jurisdiction and thereby risking accusations of  the abuse of  jurisdiction, the ILP Act 
provides a mechanism for the prosecution of  downstream activities ancillary to the illegal logging 
(i.e. importation and processing).136 By reducing the markets for unlawful goods and services, 
this kind of  downstream regulatory scheme in developed states can indirectly strengthen 
compliance with the law in developing states, without risking accusations of  cultural invasion137 
and thereby reconciling relationships between home and host states in jointly tackling human 
rights abuses in global supply chains. 
 
In addition to more effective punishments or sanctions to deter non-disclosure or poor-quality 
disclosure, the creation of  incentivising structures within the law would also help. For example, 
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public procurement guidelines based on corporate social responsibility standards 138  could 
potentially form the basis of  incentivising governance methods.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The “non-territorial spaces and management systems”139 of  MNEs and the global regulatory gaps that 
spring from them have provided the impetus for intense academic and strategic attention, and a 
consequent range of  regulatory attempts. In transnational supply chains, business entities are able 
to capitalise on the labour practices of  contractors and suppliers in foreign states with whom 
they have an arm’s-length relationship.140 The opacity of  supply chains further makes it possible 
to straddle a thin line between lawful employment and slavery or forced labour.  
 
As global governance initiatives to encourage due diligence and combat exploitation in 
multinational supply chains proliferate, home state regulation of  the global supply chains of  
corporations and the outsourcing activities of  other multinational business entities is increasingly 
gaining momentum. The UK has been a pioneer as regards global supply chain regulation, and 
has made some commendable attempts – both in case law, which embodies a hard law duty of  
care owed by focal companies towards parties affected by their overseas subsidiaries, and in 
statutory requirements embedded in the MSA. However, after an examination of  the interactions 
between these regulatory methods, particularly the legal and institutional factors hindering 
companies from making detailed and substantial disclosures under s.54 of  the MSA, we have 
identified an urgent need for a more fine-grained and coherent regulatory framework, which can 
effectively reflect the volatile regulatory, normative, and cultural environments that global supply 
chains encompass. Clear lines need to be drawn as regards a corporation’s sphere of  
accountability in the globalised context. Furthermore, the statutory steering of  CSR, particularly 
supply chain disclosure laws, should not be the major regulatory method to improve labour 
practices in transnational supply chains. It should be part of  a comprehensive strategy, within a 
framework that is designed to both incentivise supply chain sustainability and penalise business 
entities with supply chains that involve illicit labour practices.141 This will require coherent and 
compatible progression along several paths – extraterritorial jurisdiction, an extended duty of  
care for focal companies, and even downstream regulatory schemes, to name but a few.  
 
While home state regulation has to a certain extent offset the regulatory gap in international law 
by way of  forming an “expanding web of  liability”,142 the “geopolitical and geo-economic” tension 
implicated in regulating transnational business enterprises should not be overlooked.143 To end 
                                                             
138 For instance, the procurement practices and decisions of wholesalers and retailers could limit the ability of 
consumers to purchase slavery-tainted goods and services. Turner, supra note 15, at 3 & 9. 
139 John Gerard Ruggie, “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain – Issues, Actors, and Practices” (2004) 10(4) 
European Journal of International Relations 499-529, at 503. 
140 Turner, supra note 15, at 21. 
141 Ibid, at 22. 
142 Robert C Thompson, Anita Ramasastry & Mark B Taylor, “Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability 
for Business Entities Implicated in International Crimes” (2009) 40 George Washington International Law Review 841. 
143 Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Respect to Human Rights, Written Statement Submitted by Law Society of England and Wales, 1st Sess, UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG. 16/1/NGO/6 (2 July 2015), at 13, available at 
24 
 
this institutional scourge and encompass MNEs within coherent home state and extraterritorial 
regulatory regimes requires movements both at and beyond the regulatory level. For example, the 
complexity of  institutional environments necessitates adaptations to “some of  the most prominent 
features of  the current world polity and economy”:144 the structural and compositional complications of  
global chains, national competition for markets and foreign investment, state sovereignty, 
coherence between human rights law and corporate law, the highly contested legitimacy of  
extraterritorial jurisdiction – the list goes on. Indeed, as commented by Ruggie, while our hearts 
drive our instinct to eradicate modern slavery in supply chains, we still need our heads to develop 
suitable strategies to steer the heart “through the very difficult global terrain on which we are travelling”.145 
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